Classic Electronics Smart 4F Especificaciones descargar pdf (Pagina 18)

Smart Cards Lab COMPGA12 University College London

because though the functionality implemented may seem the same, the se-

curity will usually be degraded in cloned products.

Interestingly, such authentication data available inside the smart card,

that can be protected against modiﬁcation also by a hardware mechanism.

Then one card cannot be reprogrammed to simulate another card.

10.1 Further Identiﬁcation and Trace-ability and Examples

For example Philips/NXP have in addition to their UID on 4 bytes, 11

extra bytes in the ﬁrst block of the card, that cannot be changed. This

allows very easily for Philips NXP to identify counterfeit products, and for

example Fudan cloned cards from China have at this place a constant string

”08 04 00” followed by ”b c d e f g h i” in ASCII. They make it very clear

that these cards don’t come from Pilips/NXP.

Another example is the London Oyster card, where the block 4 can never

be modiﬁed AFTER the card issued, even if one knows all the secret keys

of the card. We ignore what data exactly are contained in this block but for

sure Oyster cards can be reliably traced.

Nicolas T. Courtois 2009-10

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Classic Electronics Smart 4F Especificaciones Pagina 18